Uy Chico v. Union Life Assurance Society, GR 9231, 6 January 1915 – 

Facts:
The plaintiff and his brother took over the business and continued it under the same name, “Uy Layco.” The plaintiff purchased his brother’s interest in the business and continued to carry on the business under the father’s name. Sometime before the date of the fire, “Uy Layco” was heavily indebted and subsequent thereto the creditors of the estate of the plaintiff’s father. During the course of these proceedings, the plaintiff’s attorney surrendered the policies of insurance to the administrator of the estate, who compromised with the insurance company for one-half their face value, or P6,000. This money was paid into court and is now being held by the sheriff. The plaintiff seeks to recover the face value of two insurance policies upon a stock of dry goods destroyed by fire. The plaintiff now brings this action, maintaining that the policies and goods insured belonged to him and not to the estate of his deceased father and alleges that he is not bound by the compromise effected by the administrator of his father’s estate.
The defendant insurance company sought to show that the plaintiff had agreed to compromise settlement of the policies, and for that purpose introduced evidence showing that the plaintiff’s attorney had surrendered the policies to the administrator with the understanding that such a compromise was to be effected. The plaintiff was asked, while on the witness stand, if he had any objection to his attorney’s testifying concerning the surrender of the policies, to which he replied in the negative. The attorney was then called for that purpose. Whereupon, counsel for the plaintiff formally withdrew the waiver previously given by the plaintiff and objected to the testimony of the attorney on the ground that it was privileged.

Issue:
Whether the testimony in question is privilege communication?

Held:
Of the very essence of the veil of secrecy which surrounds communications made between attorney and client, is that such communications are not intended for the information of third persons or to be acted upon by them, put of the purpose of advising the client as to his rights. It is evident that a communication made by a client to his attorney for the express purpose of its being communicated to a third person is essentially inconsistent with the confidential relation. When the attorney has faithfully carried out his instructions be delivering the communication to the third person for whom it was intended and the latter acts upon it, it cannot, by any reasoning whatever, be classified in a legal sense as a privileged communication between the attorney and his client. It is plain that such a communication, after reaching the party for whom it was intended at least, is a communication between the client and a third person, and that the attorney simply occupies the role of intermediary or agent.